

TITO'S THREAT TO STALIN'S EMPIRE

The Role America Can Play

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TO PARAPHRASE the opening sentences of a century-old political pamphlet: *A specter is haunting Communist Europe—the specter of Titoism. All the powers of the Stalinist world have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this specter: the Czar of the Kremlin and the Dean of Canterbury, Rakosi and Thorez, fellow-traveling French radicals and Eastern German police spies. Where is an oppositional group that has not been decried as Titoist by its opponents in power?*

Really, where is one? Broad and bloody purges are taking place throughout Russian-dominated Eastern Europe. Laszlo Rajk in Hungary, Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria, and Koci Drodze in Albania have been executed; General Markos of the Greek guerillas has vanished without trace; Wladislaw Gomulka in Poland, Vilem Novy in Czechoslovakia, Lucretiu Patrascanu in Rumania, and too many others to mention, have been expelled from their Communist parties and await trial and inevitable conviction. The charge is always the same: the (literally) mortal sin of sympathy with Tito's disobedient behavior. Accusations of bourgeois nationalism, anti-Soviet espionage, sabotage, and subservience to Western imperialism are also thrown in to spice the brew.

IN THE bitter struggle between Stalin and Tito, the democratic world is no mere spectator, but a participant; we have a stake in properly understanding the inner tensions of world Communism, and, if possible, in rendering them more acute. PETER MEYER here explores the roots of what by now is known as Titoism, disentangles the genuine issues from the web of accusations and recriminations, and suggests in what way the Western democracies can act so as to hope for the greatest benefit for democracy. Mr. Meyer knows Eastern Europe at first hand and has written articles on Soviet Russia for various periodicals.

In the West, the first reports of the Tito-Cominform split evoked little more than confusion. Some experts were reluctant to believe their eyes or follow their noses, and maintained that the dispute was a staged affair to deceive the West. Louis Adamic, who was disturbed but had apparently not yet made up his mind in which waters to fish, wrote that "the crisis between the Cominform and the Yugoslavs is not political but in human relations." Henry Wallace, with characteristic insight, thought that the Cominform was angry with Tito because he was slow in liquidating feudal land-ownership (which happened to be abolished in Yugoslavia decades ago). Other observers, squinting from the Right, saw merely a tussle between Tweedledum and Tweedledee; some even argued—for example, Bogdan Raditsa in the *Saturday Evening Post*—that Titoism is a potentially greater, because more insidious, danger to democracy than is Stalinism. Common to most of these reactions was the conviction that this was a family squabble of no great importance to the world.

By now, everybody has learned that the split is serious. For the purge is not confined merely to Communist parties sluggish with power. It has worked its way through the Communists in Germany, France, and Italy, and it has split the Communist party of Norway where the minority of the Central Committee expelled its "Titoist" majority, including the Number 1 leader, Peder Furubotn. Recently it reached Japan, where the best known Communist, Sanzo Nosaka, was publicly denounced from Moscow, and was temporarily saved from expulsion, even after a formal recantation, only by his popularity with party members.

Blood-letting, however, seems neither to have killed the patient nor cured him. The "disease" has spread into the ranks of fellow-

travelers: the former Member of Parliament, Konni Zilliacus, in England; the writers Jean Cassou, Edith Thomas, and Vercors in France; Louis Adamic, Jo Davidson, William S. Gailmor in America—all are joining the ranks of Tito sympathizers. In the minds of men who, while enchanted by the Communist dream, are weary of apologizing for the Russian Communist reality, there is stirring the vision of a "purified," more humane, and less opportunistic Communist movement.

Titoism, organized and unorganized, is on its way to becoming a momentous internal crisis in the postwar Communist world.

What is its driving force? In what direction is it heading?

Is Tito's heresy a matter of nationalism pure and simple, a base upsurge of pre-Communist fealties? Yes, says Moscow. In the eyes of the Kremlin, the Titoists started on the road to ruin as "bourgeois nationalists," ending up inevitably as a "band of fascists." But the Titoists reject the first label as resolutely as the second. They announce themselves true internationalists who, in the orthodox socialist tradition, defend the principle of equality among all nations, big and small. And if this means, concretely, equality between Russia and Yugoslavia—well, the Yugoslavs are not averse to accepting such a practical application of the principle. In Yugoslav eyes, the Russians are the nationalists. Obviously, nationalism and internationalism do not mean the same thing in Belgrade and Moscow.

Recently, with increasing theoretical abandon, the Yugoslav leaders have begun to speak of their fight against Russian "imperialism." But since they are still loyal to the official Communist doctrine that imperialism is the final stage of capitalist society and nothing else, they fail to explain where imperialism comes from in a Russian society they still acknowledge to be "socialist," if wicked. For the rest of the world, however, unshackled by Communist dogma, the term "imperialism" only describes what everybody can see with naked eye: Russia is an expansionist power, conquering, exploiting, and oppress-

ing foreign peoples for the benefit of its own ruling class.

Actually, no observer at all objective believes that in today's Russia there is either socialism or a "classless society." Nor is Russia approaching these goals. Quite the contrary: the gap between the social classes is greater in Russia than in most capitalist countries and is widening every day. A tight, hierarchically organized bureaucracy is the ruling class. It alone decides on production and distribution, war and peace, on all matters of economics and politics. The rest of the population—workers, kolkhoz peasants, slave laborers—is a mere living appendix to the material means of production.

This Russian society is full of inner contradictions, although they take forms other than those familiar to capitalism. In spite of all planning, immense disproportions appear in economic life. The automatic, if haphazardly functioning, control of economic life by the free market was abolished; rational planning by discussion, criticism, public opinion, was not allowed to develop. The result is disorder, waste, duplication, inflated overhead charges, immense spending for unproductive purposes, parasitism on an unheard-of scale, and a generally low productivity of labor. Instead of capitalism's "reserve army" of the unemployed, Russia has an ever increasing army of slowly dying slave laborers; instead of "overproduction," it has chronic underproduction, lack of consumption goods, lack of raw materials, lack of industrial and agricultural equipment, lack of skilled labor.

These chronic disproportions and recurrent shortages, abetted by a resurgent Russian chauvinism, impel the regime to foreign expansion. Subjugated territories can be a source of cheap raw materials, consumption goods, machinery, skilled workers and technicians, and additional recruits for the army of forced labor. They are also a happy hunting ground for members of the Russian ruling class who can be sent into the occupied areas as instructors, advisers, administrators, officers, agitators. Strategic-military considerations are a motive too, of course. But if these could perhaps explain the occupation

of certain territories, they do not explain the ruthless economic exploitation that accompanies this occupation.

AMONG the various methods of Russian exploitation, the traditional imperialist one of profitable investment plays only a minor role. Some small short-term loans for financing trade with Russia have been granted (to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and recently China). Conditions are rigid and payments enforced. But in general, the Russians do not invest—they take away.

The simplest method is looting. Billions of dollars worth of industrial equipment has been removed from Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Manchuria, and other satellite countries. At the same time, "reparations" in goods are strictly exacted and are valued, for the occasion, at the lower pre-war prices. Heavy fines are imposed for late deliveries. How far this sort of chicanery can go is well illustrated in the case of several small ships delivered by Finland as reparations. The boats were delivered in time to avoid a fine, they were built accurately to complicated specifications, but they were still refused by Russian inspectors because there was no picture of Stalin in the masters' cabins!

Another instrument of exploitation exists in the mixed Russian-satellite companies, which today own the most important industries in Eastern Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The assets are entirely furnished by the occupied country; fifty per cent—and more—of the profits go to Russia, which dominates the administration. Some details about the working of these companies were revealed in a report published by the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Trade, Milentije Popovic. In the course of negotiations for the founding of a Russian-Yugoslav company to develop Yugoslav oil resources, the Russians demanded that the Yugoslavs throw in the oil lands for nothing and split the profits with Russia fifty-fifty. When the Yugoslavs suggested that the value of the oil lands be considered in estimating the contributions of both countries, it was dismissed by the Russians as a demand for "capitalist

rent." In Bulgarian and Rumanian timber-cutting companies, the Russians make a fifty per cent profit per year on their "investment."

Finally, there are the less publicized, but very efficient, methods of exploiting dependent countries through subtleties of foreign trade. The satellites "negotiate" commercial treaties with Russia. The details of such treaties are never published, but we have some glimpses into their workings. According to the above-mentioned report by Popovic, Yugoslavia had to pay two million dollars for generators which could be obtained in Western Germany for \$450,000; \$41,850 for suction pumps priced at \$13,000 in the West; \$377,000 for cranes obtainable elsewhere for \$250,000. But it had to sell its copper and bauxite to the Russians at far below the world price. Similarly, according to official Hungarian statistics for 1947, the index of Hungarian export prices to the Soviet Union was 47 per cent lower than the index of export prices to the Marshall Plan countries. In 1946-47, Poland exported to Russia 14.5 million tons of coal for \$1 a ton, while the export price to other countries was \$10-12 in 1946 and \$15-16 in 1947. One nice feature of this commerce is that Russia often sells a part of such imports to other satellite countries at a considerable profit. In 1946 Finland bought commodities of Polish origin for 1,663 million Finnish marks; only 12 million marks' worth were bought directly from Poland, the rest from Russia.

THE more industrialized satellite countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, find that enforced subservience to Moscow is crippling their economy. They can rationally develop their industries only by economic collaboration with the West, where they can get machines, capital, some necessary raw materials, and profitable prices for their exports. That is why, in 1947, the Czechoslovak Cabinet decided—unanimously and with the consent of all its Communist members—to accept the Marshall Plan. At that time, a Polish government delegation was in Prague, and the decision was made in agreement with

the Poles. But immediately afterwards, Premier Gottwald was called to Moscow, and in twenty-four hours the Czech cabinet decision was reversed by a *coup de téléphone*.

As to the predominantly agrarian satellites, their main economic problem was, and is, chronic agrarian overpopulation. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, countries of small peasants, there were no great estates to be divided. In Hungary and Rumania, the distribution of land created dwarf parcels which could not secure a decent living to their owners. The only solution of the economic problems of these countries would be a judicious industrialization—which would absorb a part of the peasantry into the city—combined with the modernization of agriculture. That was recognized, before the war, by all serious students of East Europe.

But Russia considers the satellite countries primarily as sources of cheap raw materials and half-finished products which are badly needed in the Soviet Union, and which are more profitable to import than manufactured goods. Therefore, the claims of Czech and Polish Communists that Marshall Plan aid, accepted under appropriate guarantees for political independence, could strengthen the nationalized economies of their countries, were rejected as treasonable. The Yugoslav industrialization plan was rebuked by Moscow as "adventurous," and Bulgaria was condemned, in the words of one Titoist wit, to remain the "vegetable garden" of the Empire.

THE satellite countries are, then, administered according to Russian plan—but by a native Communist bureaucracy, which came to power under Russian orders and with Russian help, and which works under Russian supervision. This makes for interesting complications, all of which end by putting the native bureaucrats in an anomalous position. On the one hand, they know only too well that they need Russian protection against the resistance of the population, against attempts at restoration of the *ancien régime*, against possible foreign political and economic pressure. On the other, they are in the unenviable position of having to exact

tribute for their foreign protectors and to introduce measures that ruin the country's economy. Their role as the agents of foreign domination increases the hatred of the people; their meek attempts to reduce Russian interference make them suspect in Russian eyes.

In addition, the native Communist bureaucrats of each country know that their specific interests are small change in Russia's pocket. Did not Russia sell out Yugoslav claims to Trieste and South Carinthia? Was it not ready to detach the Macedonian regions of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in order to create an "independent" Macedonian satellite? Will it not some day give Czechoslovak Teschen to Poland? Will it not create an "independent" Soviet Slovakia? Can it not return the Oder-Neisse territories to its puppets in Eastern Germany? Can it not even decide to throw out the native Quislings and replace them with Russian Gauleiters?

It was against the possibility of such threats eventuating that plans were conceived for a kind of East European Federation, which would also be an economic blessing of the first order. But "*Divide et impera*" is the slogan of the Russian, as well as of other, imperialists. Even before the end of the war, Russia prohibited a Czech-Polish federation which had been agreed upon by the Czech and Polish governments-in-exile in London. After the war, Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communists conducted negotiations looking forward to implementing the old socialist and Communist slogan of a Balkan or, at least, South-Slavic federation. Immediately, Dimitrov was publicly rebuked in *Pravda*, and had to disavow the plan. (How sincere his renunciation was, remains a moot question; the Yugoslavs maintain that Dimitrov encouraged their revolt, even after their open split with the Cominform.) At the same time, Traicho Kostov was expelled from the Bulgarian Politburo with an official explanation that he had "misused Dimitrov's name in sowing distrust of Russia," and a few weeks later Dimitrov was sent to Russia where he conveniently died. Now his nearest friend, Kolarov, is also dead; Kostov was executed, and the Bulgarian

Communist party is being thoroughly purged of collaborators of the old leadership.

Under these circumstances, the satellite bureaucracy cannot but be ill at ease. If it does not resist, it surely at least dreams of resistance. There is no doubt that many Communist leaders in the satellite countries want to be more independent. But can they get away with it?

TITO, the first to stage a serious rebellion, *did* get away with it. Because of that he represents an incendiary example to the rest of Eastern Europe, threatening the Russian Empire with fragmentation.

Tito's success has some specifically Yugoslav reasons, bound up with the history of the Yugoslav Communist party. Tito himself has given us an eight-hour-long speech on the subject. That was at the Yugoslav Party Congress in 1948, and Tito had a good pretext. He was supposed to give a report on the activities of the Central Committee since the last party convention. It so happened that the previous convention had taken place just twenty years earlier, in April 1928; Tito gave his version of the whole party history, since its foundation.

In 1921, the Yugoslav Communist party was forced, after a brief legal existence, to go underground. The Central Committee went abroad and the party membership was persecuted and almost completely destroyed. What remained was the conspiratorial apparatus, directed from abroad, and maintaining some precarious contacts with small scattered groups in the country. In 1929, when King Alexander proclaimed his military dictatorship, the Comintern ordered an "armed uprising." The Central Committee in exile obligingly transmitted the order. No uprising materialized, of course, but the remaining Communists in the country were arrested, tortured, and many of them killed in Yugoslav jails. One of those who survived in jail—where he was secure from Russian purges!—is the veteran leader, and today's chief Yugoslav theoretician, Mosha Pijade.

Between 1930 and 1937, the Yugoslav Communist party practically did not exist.

Different refugee factions still fought for "leadership" in the emigration, accused each other of "deviations," of treason and spying, denounced each other to Stalin, ran to the Kremlin for arbitration. The Comintern expelled whole groups, created new "rank-and-file" factions to end all factions, imposed new "leaderships," but to no avail.

Finally, in 1937, Moscow decided to dismiss all members of the then existing Central Committee—except one. When Tito, in his speech at the 1948 congress, got to this point, the whole convention gave him a thunderous ovation. Everybody knew that this one was Tito. He was given the power to re-register all remaining members and sympathizers, in or out of jail, in or out of the country. He expelled whom he wished, kept whom he wished, and accepted whom he wanted from among the new recruits. He came to power in the party as an emissary of Moscow but with practically unlimited powers, and under conditions of illegality which made it difficult to keep check on him.

This was the time of the "Popular Front," when the Comintern proclaimed its eagerness for an alliance with "all democratic elements." New recruits were won on this platform: young intellectuals, republicans sympathizing with the Spanish Loyalists, people opposed to the appeasement of Hitler. It was during this period that the Yugoslav Communist party was reborn, and so it is not astonishing that there are no "old Bolsheviks" and even no "old Stalinists" in Yugoslavia. The present leadership is made up of relatively young men, in their thirties or forties. They know the history of the socialist and Communist movements only in its most recent Stalinist version, and the old ideological controversies only from biased hearsay.

In 1941 there were already about twelve thousand party members. Some three thousand of them survived the war. These three thousand are today the ruling class of Yugoslavia. From their ranks are recruited the 122 members of the leading bodies of the party; these 122 hold, among themselves, 833 key positions as federal and state cabinet ministers, leaders of mass organizations, and

top regional executives. They are a closely-knit group. They were recruited and educated by Tito and owe him their personal allegiance. They constitute the famous Dedinje elite, named after the suburb of Belgrade where they now live in luxury.

IMPORTANT also is the fact that the Yugoslavs were not freed by the triumphant Red Army, or by any other foreign army, though they were considerably aided by Western supplies. The Yugoslavs are very proud of having "liberated themselves" and are never tired of joking about the "men with pipes" (Gottwald, Dimitrov, Rakosi) who sat in Moscow smoking and waiting until the Red Army brought them back to their countries. By the time the war approached its end, sizable territories were already in the hands of Tito's partisans, and Yugoslavs are fond of remembering that the commander of the Soviet armies, when he got to the borders of Serbia, found it expedient to ask the Partisan government for permission to enter Yugoslav territory.

The partisans were, at that time, no loose bands of *francs-tireurs*. They were rigidly organized in "brigades" and "divisions," and in special elite troops, called "proletarian divisions," composed, if not of proletarians, at least of trusted Communists. There was an elaborate military hierarchy abounding, in Balkan fashion, with colonels and generals. There was a secret police, the famous OZNA, terrorizing all "deviationists." The political arm of the government was the "Popular Front," decoratively trimmed with some liberal intellectuals, but created and dominated, as official speeches always have stressed, by the Communist party.

After the liberation, the military-political hierarchy of the partisans took over the state. The leaders of democratic parties who were taken into the government under the Tito-Subasic agreement were absolutely impotent. They were not allowed to rebuild their party organizations; there was no free press, and no free speech. The police terror was unrestrained. Thousands were abruptly jailed as "enemies of the nation," put into concentra-

tion camps without trial, their wealth expropriated. Non-Communist leaders were soon thrown out of government and parliament. A series of political trials was conducted, exactly after Soviet models. The leaders of the democratic peasant and socialist parties (Macek, Topalovic) were forced to live in exile. Those remaining in the country were either jailed or interned in remote places.

Yugoslavia became *the* model satellite. It was a one-party state at a time when other satellite countries still had coalition governments and tolerated some opposition. It was the first to complete the nationalization of its industries; its five-year plan was the most ambitious; its machinery of repression was the most efficient. Satellite statesmen traveled to Belgrade to learn how such things are done; Yugoslav police instructors went to Budapest and Sofia to teach their colleagues the latest Communist methods of dealing with the opposition. Yet the most perfect satellite was the first to rebel.

THE question is being asked more and more frequently: was there a world-wide "Titoist" conspiracy of long standing within the Communist movement? The MVD, of course, says yes: Rajk, Kostov, and Drodze were simply agents, planted and supported by Tito, just as Tito was an agent of the British and American intelligence. Nobody in his senses believes the second part of this accusation. But there are serious observers—for instance, Ruth Fischer in her recent article in *Life* magazine—who are ready to give some credence to the first part of it.

According to this theory, which has to fill out the gaps in information by more or less probable speculations, the Communist leaders of the wartime resistance movements in the different European countries were wary of Moscow and tried to keep their movements independent of the Kremlin's emissaries.

A long time ago, Dimitrov had chosen Tito as the Yugoslav leader; the negotiations for a South Slavic federation were conducted by the Bulgarian master and his Yugoslav disciple from the very beginning in opposi-

tion to Moscow and with the perspective of creating a more or less autonomous bloc of Communist states from the Baltic to the Aegean. Moves and counter-moves in the subterranean struggle were made on both sides according to plan, and in full consciousness of the issues involved.

The evidence, however, does not seem to bear out this interpretation. Instead of a planned, coordinated progress towards a pre-conceived aim, we see on the side of the "Titoists" hesitation and vacillation. Before the open break in Yugoslavia, the similarity of oppositionist tendencies in different Communist parties was largely the result of the similar positions in which the satellite bureaucrats found themselves in regard to Russian imperialism and the needs of their own countries. Since June 1948, to be sure, those opposition groups which are aware of the necessity of a full break (and which probably form only a minor part of the "deviationist" bureaucracy), may have been seeking organizational contacts with Belgrade. But, even so, any vision of a "purified," international, anti-Stalinist Communism, led by Tito, is probably a mirage. Tito, like Stalin, is a totalitarian, and a national despot is ill-suited to be the leader of international revolution. One has only to think of Napoleon and Lenin—and Stalin.

The satellite bureaucracy originally came to power with many illusions about its future role in the framework of the Russian bloc; it was again and again surprised by every new step towards centralization and *Gleichschaltung* dictated from Moscow. It always accepted Moscow decisions, even if it executed them with a marked lack of enthusiasm. Whenever it ventured an independent step (Czech acceptance of the Marshall Plan, negotiations for the South Slavic federation), it was done in the expectation that Moscow would condone it; whenever consent was denied, the step was retraced immediately. Even the Yugoslavs, as we shall see, were driven to each step of resistance and into the final break by a series of ultimatums which gave them no choice other than resistance or suicidal, unconditional surrender.

THE Yugoslav revolt was so much of a top-echelon affair that the Yugoslav people had no inkling of it up to the very moment when it was announced from Moscow.

The real reason for the Tito-Cominform split cannot be easily found in the famous Cominform resolution of June 1948. At first glance, this resolution is one of the most confused documents of our confused era. It reproaches Tito for collectivizing too fast; it reproaches him for collectivizing too slowly. It accuses him of "rightist" hesitations and "ultra-left" adventures. It says that he neglected the leading role of the Communist party and that he introduced a dictatorship of the party leadership. It even castigates him for lack of democracy and excess of terror. It almost looks as if a bright—or rather not so bright—young man in the Cominform had been given an alphabetic manual of deviations and had copied diligently every item from A (adventurism) through B (Bernsteinism and Bucharinism) to Z (Zinovievism).

But there are serious points. The Yugoslav party leaders, the resolution says, had a "hostile attitude" toward the Soviet Union. They spoke, among themselves, about "Russian imperialism." They watched the Russian instructors through their own secret police.

The inside story was revealed when Belgrade published the correspondence between the Yugoslav and Russian Communist parties. It is not, to be sure, the whole story, but it offered enough clues for the puzzle to fall into place.

The earliest incidents mentioned go back to 1944-45. During the Soviet occupation of Serbia, some Russian officers committed what are described as "offenses of a moral character." In a confidential meeting, Milovan Djilas, a member of the Yugoslav Politburo, said that Russian officers seemed to be on a lower moral level than "even" the British officers. That was reported to Moscow. Stalin sent Tito a telegram saying: "It is inadmissible to slander, in such a way, the army which helped you to expel the Germans." Djilas had to go to Moscow and explain the incident. According to the Rus-

sians, he apologized abjectly and asked to be forgiven; in the Yugoslav version, he explained that what he meant was that someone might be led to say that Russian officers did not behave quite correctly.

Another incident is still more interesting. Tito spoke in Ljubljana about Trieste and said: "We do not want to pay [other nations'] foreign obligations, we do not want to be pawns in the dealing between various spheres of interest." Moscow considered this a veiled attack on its policies and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade received the following instructions: "The speech of Comrade Tito is a hostile attack against the Soviet Union. Tell Comrade Tito, if he makes one more such attack, that we will be forced to criticize and to disavow him publicly."

On June 5, 1945, Foreign Minister Kardelj received the Soviet Ambassador and told him that he, Kardelj, considered Moscow's criticism fully justified and understood perfectly that Moscow could not tolerate such things. He added that Tito, although he had great merits, was over-confident; he complained that there was no collective leadership, implying that Tito alone decided everything. "We would wish," he said, "that the Soviet Union consider us not as representatives of a foreign country but rather as representatives of one of the future Soviet Republics, and our party as part and parcel of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." To this the Russian Ambassador replied with magnificent punctilio that Yugoslavia was, after all, an independent country, and its Communist party an independent party. The Russians, he added, would be glad to give their advice but such advice must be sought before and not after the event.

It is difficult to decide whether Kardelj was ready to sell out his master or whether he just wanted to fool Moscow at that time. But the incident illustrates how hard the Yugoslavs tried to avoid an open break.

From that time on, a silent but ruthless struggle began between the secret police of both countries. The OZNA watched every step of Soviet emissaries. The NKVD recruited agents to watch over all activities of

the Yugoslav leaders. Later on, in a letter to Stalin, Tito complained that a Yugoslav Army commander gets only nine to eleven thousand dinars a month, a member of the Yugoslav federal Cabinet only twelve thousand, but a colonel-lieutenant in the Russian military mission thirty to forty thousand dinars. Yugoslavia could not pay, he told Stalin, the immense salaries of such "advisers." The Soviet government replied that it could not reduce the salaries of the instructors. The Yugoslavs countered with a proposal to reduce their number. Russia answered by recalling its military mission. That was in March 1948, and with this incident the break was practically consummated. It only remained to prepare the other satellite leaders, to invite the rebellious Yugoslav leaders to Bucharest, and, when they refused, to write the excommunicating resolution.

IN THE annals of the Communist movement, one can find no opposition faction which has produced so little ideological expression as the Titoists. The Titoists now speak frequently about how every country should find its own way to socialism. But they always fail to state concretely how their way differs from the Russian. Even after two years of open hostility, the issue remains the degree of relative autonomy, and the comparative financial and social status, of the two Communist bureaucracies. The Yugoslav revolt developed from that of agents who wanted to become junior partners to that of agents who now want to open their own shop. It is still the same kind of shop.

Yugoslavia is today as totalitarian as it was in 1948. The "voluntary" work brigades have been abolished, it is true, but forced labor in factories was introduced at the same time. The "election reform" of January 1950 is pure window-dressing: it permits putting up independent candidates if they can gather one hundred endorsements in their district, but oppositional parties, press, and agitation are still forbidden. The deputy who reported the bill to parliament was careful to stress that the Yugoslav government cannot be changed by elections because it was installed

by a revolution, and that cabinet changes similar to those in Western countries are out of the question. Tito himself reiterated, in February 1950: "Two programs cannot exist in our country. . . . Revolution is a brutal thing." It is: the terror in Yugoslavia has not changed except that "Moscow trials" are now also conducted against people accused of being agents of Moscow.

BUT, even without benefit of ideology, in the last two years the rift between Belgrade and Moscow has widened immensely and Russian propaganda has reached the point of describing Yugoslavia as a fascist state. Sharp notes have been followed by the denunciation of treaties, a virtual suspension of diplomatic relations, an economic blockade against Yugoslavia, organized border incidents, and a deployment of Russian troops on the Yugoslav borders. The "cold war" between Russia and Yugoslavia can become violent at any moment.

From the Russian point of view, the situation is simple: centrifugal tendencies in the Russian Empire must be crushed. That means, in the first place, extensive purges everywhere in the Russian orbit. Moreover, wherever possible, native bureaucrats, inherently suspect, must be replaced either by "native" Communists who have spent their whole adult life in Russia or, still better, by Russian bureaucrats and generals such as Rokossovsky, the new dictator of Poland. Finally, the source of infection, the living proof that a revolt against Moscow is not only desirable but also possible, Tito's Yugoslavia, must be liquidated. But this, it turns out, is no easy matter.

Recent experience has shown that Tito cannot be overthrown merely by economic pressure. Nor has Moscow's propaganda had any appreciable effect on the Yugoslav Communist party; defections are negligible, there are no uprisings, and, indeed, there is no internal resistance to speak of except some isolated cases of sabotage. The prospects of organizing anti-Tito guerillas are rather dim; the ex-partisan Tito and his totalitarian apparatus know well how to handle them.

Neither can a direct attack by satellite armies help. The Yugoslav Army is stronger, and it is a good bet that the satellite troops would disintegrate after the first battle, if not before. So there is only one sure way to get rid of Tito: direct Russian armed intervention.

This intervention would have occurred a long time ago, if the Russians could be certain that it would not precipitate a world war. It *may* yet occur, if they are left in doubt about it. It *will not occur*, if the Western powers make it unmistakably clear that they will consider a military attack on Yugoslavia a *casus belli*. What Moscow wants, is clear. What it does, depends on Washington.

After all, one obvious thing should not be forgotten. Although Titoist tendencies are produced and constantly reproduced by the inner contradictions of the Russian Empire, it would be impossible for them to become open revolts without the existence of an outside force opposing this empire. The Yugoslavs could not even have thought of resistance if America had been in retreat, if the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact had not consolidated the forces opposing Communism, if the nearest American troops had been, instead of in Germany, Austria, and Trieste, somewhere in the Western hemisphere. Without American resistance to Stalin's rule in Europe, there could have been no Tito. Without continued American resistance, there will be no Tito.

FROM Tito's point of view, only one thing is absolutely clear: reconciliation with Moscow is impossible. If they did not know it before, the Yugoslav leaders learned from the fate of Rajk and Kostov what they can expect if they fall into Russian hands: arrest, confession, ignominious death. If Stalin conquers Yugoslavia, the whole native bureaucracy will be exterminated, and the bulk of the nation might even be "resettled" in Siberia—as an example to other satellites. The Titoist leaders know that they cannot go back to Moscow.

But where can they go? Their original aim, to become junior partners in the Russian Empire, has proved utopian: there can be no

Communist commonwealth of nations because Russia will not have it. So Yugoslavia is in a paradoxical situation: it can perhaps remain an independent Communist state in the anti-Communist alliance; it cannot remain an independent Communist state in the Communist bloc. It is condemned to continual acrobatics between East and West, between democratic slogans in foreign affairs and anti-democratic terrorism in internal politics. Tito will continue to try to seduce the other satellite states into joining his bolt from the Russian prison, but at present they have neither the strength, the courage, nor the desperation. The masters of Belgrade have perfected tight-rope walking to a high degree. But can it go on forever? And where does the rope end?

THAT depends, among other things, on the policies of the Western world. There are three courses possible.

The first is the policy of non-intervention, letting Stalin and Tito fight it out. Practically, it would mean a Russian military attack on Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia's final defeat and annihilation, the consolidation of Russian rule in Eastern and Central Europe. That is a policy of disaster.

The second possibility is limited, but unconditional, support of Yugoslavia, without any interference in the Titoist dictatorship. This seems to be the present policy of the State Department. It is substantially the same course many conservative groups propose to follow in respect to Franco: anyone who is ready to fight Russia should be accepted as an ally.

There is a third possible policy, that of unlimited, but *conditional*, support. It would be made absolutely clear to Russia that an armed attack on Yugoslavia will not be tolerated. But the extent of direct help—economic, political, and military—to Tito would be made dependent on the introduction of certain reforms in Yugoslavia. The West cannot reasonably demand the re-introduction of free enterprise in Yugoslavia: if England can stay in the Western bloc with nationalized industries, so can Yugoslavia, if

its people choose. But an amnesty to political prisoners, the admission of democratic parties to reasonably free elections, some guarantees for freedom of speech and press—America can indicate that all these would facilitate the granting of loans, the export of machines, technical assistance, and the delivery of arms. Such a policy, in proper doses, can induce the Titoist government to make some democratic concessions. Tito's need is great, and we have much to offer.

It might be said that such a policy would drive Tito back to the Cominform camp. But this is nonsense: the Titoists simply cannot go back, under penalty of death. Or it might be objected that such democratic concessions would weaken Yugoslavia's fight against Moscow. But this is improbable. Of course, the Cominform propagandists will shout about betrayal, but they do it anyway; their arsenal of vituperation is already exhausted. If they add that Yugoslavia is "fascist" because it makes concessions to "bourgeois" political freedoms—which all the peoples of Eastern Europe want—it certainly would not make the name-calling more effective.

No doubt the Titoist bureaucracy would oppose such reforms. It cannot accept them sincerely. It will make reforms only under pressure, reluctantly, and in the hope of being able to sabotage their enforcement. But it will reason—it will *have* to reason—this way: It is better to accept small reforms than to be overthrown; some political freedoms cannot do us much harm, so long as we hold the top levels of state power; the Communist party can still win even in relatively free elections; if we survive the storm, we can go back again. In other words the Titoists will have to prefer some calculated risks to a certain defeat.

How successful their calculation will prove, depends on the growth of democratic forces in Yugoslavia and elsewhere. The fight against Russian imperialism can only achieve success by invigorating the democratic forces in opposition to it. And the Western world is certainly more interested in the victory of democracy than in the preservation of the rule of the Dedinje elite.